Sincethe terrorist attack on America on September 11, hundreds of newsecurity measures have been put in place to make Americans safer, orat least feel safer. Hotels and corporate offices now require gueststo present a photo ID at check-ins and entrances. Airlines refuse tolet passengers carry razor blades, scissors, or screwdrivers onflights.

Atleast one surefire way exists to improve security and protectpersonal privacy: positive passenger bag-matching. It would requirethat no checked bag be transported on a plane if its owner doesn'tboard the flight. Bag-matching became standard practice in Europe andAsia in the 1980s after suitcase bombs brought down Pan Am Flight 103over Lockerbie, Air India Flight 182 en route to London, and UTAFlight 772 to Paris. In all three cases, the terrorists weren't onboard. 

Yet,in the U.S., where security is now top priority, authorities havechosen to ignore bag-matching. Instead, the Transportation SafetyAdministration (TSA) has embraced largely untestedelectronic-detection systems that screen bags for bombs and otherexplosives. Critics charge that the TSA has overlookedsuch an obvious, sensible security measure because U.S. airlines haveopposed bag-matching for years. They fear it might delay flights andpersuade short-haul travelers to take a train or drive instead.   

AfterSeptember 11, bag-matching was back on the agenda. Yet, strugglingairlines complained that implementing it on all domestic flightswould drive them into bankruptcy. Such claims have zero merit, saysArnold Barnett, a former chair of the Federal AviationAdministration's technical team. In 1996, the team was asked toinvestigate the feasibility of bag-matching. In a 1997 experiment,which tested 11 airlines, 50 pairs of cities, 8,000 flights, and750,000 passengers, Barnett showed that domestic bag-matching wouldcause delays averaging seven minutes on only one in seven flights andwould require no reduction in flight schedules.

Barnettargues that bag-matching would deter bombers far more thanelectronic-detection systems. It ensures that the terrorist willproceed to the gate to board his plane. If, while he's waiting,detection devices reveal a bomb, he could be quickly located andarrested. “The combination of bag-matching and explosives detectioncould be far more potent than either measure on its own,” Barnettwrote in a Dec. 17 letter to TSA chief. He received a thank-you notethat contained no indication that the TSA is contemplating action.